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CHristina Hoff, "Kaht's Invidious Humanism,"� 
Environmental Ethics 5 (Spring, 1983): 63-70� 
Kaht's position 6n <Hilma!, has been 
abiy treateeJ in the recent past. 1 
UnfortuHately, Hoff does. hot cite 
these treatments, ahd spends mucH of 
tier time. repeating what has gone on 
blHdt-e: for Kant we have no direct 
dUti~s to animals sihce they are not 
rational or self-conscious or capable of 
moral legislation; animals are therefore 
means only or things, and 
is useful for us to act as 
duties to .animals, this is 
of respect for humanity, 
cruel . to animals makes 
although it 
if We have 
only a sign 
since being 
us more 
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inclined to be cruel to human beings. 
As Broadie and Pybus put it: "Having 
ceremoniously ushered animals out of 
the front door of the moral universe, 
Kant has, with commendable discre­
tion, tried to smuggle them in again 
through the back. "2 Broadie and 
Pybus have also previously alerted us 
to the fact that this Kantian view is 
evidenced in the Lectures on Ethics, 
the Groundwork, and (unmentioned by 
Hoff) the Metaphysics of Morals. And 
Broadie, Pybus, and Regan have pre­
viously criticized Kant's position on 
animals, as does Hoff. 
What does Hoff tell us that is new? 
She ma kes much of the fact that the 
first formulation of the categorical 
imperative makes no mention of a 
moral domain. Only in the second 
formulation, which she calls the 
"humanistic imperative," is the com­
munity of moral subjects limited to 
rational beings. Hoff implies, but 
does not state, that Kant could have 
had an ethics of universalizability 
without being a speciesist, but it is 
by no means clear that this is her 
view. At one point (p. 68) she 
implies that she is an intuitionist when 
she states regarding Kant's humanism 
that "In the absence of good argu­
ments in favor of a dogmatic and 
exclusive humanism, we may trust our 
moral intuitions." The "common moral 
intuition" she refers to is that suffer­
ing is an evil, and it is wrong to 
gratuitously and deliberately inflict it 
on animal s (p. 67) . This is fine as 
far as it goes, but one wishes that 
Hoff would have treated equally com­
mon intuitions regarding animals, and 
perhaps conflicting ones, e.g., that 
meat-eating is legitimate. 
I n addition to concentrating on the 
differences between the first and sec­
ond formulations of the categorical 
imperative, Hoff contributes to ou r 
understanding of Kant's position on 
animals in her treatment of "the 
patient-agent parity thesis" (p. 69), 
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which suggests that the domai n of 
moral agents coincides with that of 
moral patients. Kant holds this thesis 
rega rding animals. But if he aban­
doned it regarding the mentally enfee­
bled, which seems likely, then he 
would be inconsistent since the men­
tally enfeebled are not rational, self­
conscious, or moral legislators. That 
is, Kant could have learned a great 
deal from what is now commonly called 
the argument from marginal cases. J 
Hoff concludes that the patient-agent 
parity thesis must be rejected because 
the domain of moral patients is much 
la rger than that of moral agents. 
Much more work needs to be done 
on the relationship between Kant and 
Kantianism, on the one hand, and 
speciesism, on the other. This is 
why I have emphasized Hoff's redun­
dancy. Charles Hartshorne· gives us 
some clues as to what might still be 
done in this area. 4 The rationality 
that Ka nt ta kes to be the p recond ition 
of value is not the absolute thing in 
human beings that he takes it to be. 
If there is an absolute quality of 
rationality that a higher animal lacks, 
then a human being lacks it as well. 
Kant says 5 that only a rational will 
that acts according to its rationality is 
intrinsically . or unqualifiedly good. 
But he also admits that human beings 
so act only imperfectly or incom­
pletely. On Iy God always and enti rely 
conforms to rational requirements. 
From this point of view no animal, not 
even a human being, is really an end 
in itself. In the sense in which any 
animal has intrinsic value, for Harts­
horne, all an imals have some of it, 
and the differences are matters of 
degree. The really significant differ­
ence, as Hartshorne sees it, is 
between any animal and Everlast­the 
ing. 
That is, although Hoff's treatment 
of intrinsic value in animals is well 
done, more thought has to be given to 
the extent of Kant's invidious 
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humanism: it causes 
treat unfavorably 
him not 
any 
only to 
bei ngs 
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"beneath" human beings, but also any 
possible bei ng above human beings. 
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2 Alexander Broadie and Elizabeth M. 
Pybus, "Kant's Treatment of Animals," 
p. 383. 
This argument can be found, 
among other places, in Tom Regan, 
"Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation," 
Ethics 88 (Jan., 1978): 126-133. To 
the possible objection that this argu­-
ment was beyond anything that Kant 
could have thought of in the eight­-
eenth century, it should be noted that 
the argument was discovered in anti­-
quity. See my "Vegetarianism and the 
Argument from Marginal Cases in Por­-
phyry," to appear in 1984 in the 
Journal of the History of Ideas. 
.. See" Fou ndations for a Humane 
Ethics: What Human Beings Have in 
Common with Other Higher Animals," 
in On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights 
and Human Ethics, ed. by Richa rd 
Knowles Morris (Wash., D. C.: Acrop­-
olis Press, 1978), pp. 170-171; "The 
Rights of the Subhuman World," Envi­-
ronmental Ethics 1 (1979), pp. 50-51; 
and "The Environmental Results of 
Technology," in Philosophy and Envi­-
ronmental Crisis, ed. by William T. 
Blackstone (Athens, Ga.: University 
of Georgia Press, 1974), p. 72. 
5 L.ectures on- Ethics, trans. by Louis 
Infield (N. Y. : Harper and Row, 
1963), pp. 239-240. Kant's view that 
we do not have direct duties to ani­-
mals, only indirect ones, is not solely 
due to his rationalism, as Hoff 
implies. It may also be due to Chris­-
tian influences on him; St. Thomas 
Aqui nas held a similar view. See 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Th i rd Book, 
Part II, Chapter CXII. 
